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OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the usual host of cases in the
field of criminal law and procedure was decided by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals.' The discussion which follows is a sampling of the more signifi-
cant and interesting cases, but, even then, only a brief review will be possi-
ble. It is the goal of this survey to furnish the practitioner with introductory
1. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed over 225 cases on criminal law and
procedure. Over ninety of the opinions were published.
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material in significant areas of the criminal field, thereby providing the
reader with guidance for further research.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Standng
In United States v. Ri'os,2 one of the issues confronting the Tenth Circuit
was whether the defendant Rios had standing to object to an allegedly ille-
gal search and seizure. Rios was charged with conspiracy to commit various
federal drug offenses, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and the
actual distribution of heroin. He sought to suppress the seized heroin on the
basis that the search warrant's supporting affidavit contained significant
misrepresentations. Rios asserted that the search warrant was thereby defi-
cient for lack of probable cause.
3
In an opinion written by Judge Holloway, the Tenth Circuit court
noted that the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establish-
ing standing to assert a fourth amendment claim. 4 Initially, Rios had
claimed standing as the legal owner of the mobile home where the ques-
tioned search took place. He actually had sold the home and was no longer
in possession thereof, but he had retained legal title pursuant to the purchase
agreement. 5 The Tenth Circuit observed that "bare legal ownership" did
not support Rios' standing claim. 6 While intricate analysis of legal and eq-
uitable ownership may be important in the area of property law, a distinc-
tion between legal and equitable ownership becomes meaningless in fourth
amendment claims, unless viewed in terms of a legitimate expectation of
privacy. 7 The court of appeals found that no privacy interest was created by
Rios' use of the mobile home nor by any pendent legal rights which he may
have possessed in the home.8
Rios successfully contended that he had standing to object to the search
because of the "automatic standing rule," which purportedly confers stand-
ing on a defendant to assert a fourth amendment claim when the criminal
charge involves a possessory offense. 9 Since Rios was charged with posses-
sion of heroin, the Tenth Circuit turned to the merits of his claim. The court
addressed the issue of whether the search warrant was defective.
Although the warrant had authorized the search of four closely situated
2. 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979). Also decided within this survey period was United
States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1980) (similar facts).
3. 611 F.2d at 1343.
4. Id. at 1344 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n.l (1978)).
5. Rios had sold the home to a co-defendant. Thereafter, Rios neither lived there, nor
kept any personal effects there, nor had a key. Legal title was to be transferred only after all
payments were made.
6. 611 F.2d at 1345.
7. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (fourth amendment does not recognize "ar-
cane distinctions developed in property and tort law"); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266
(1960) (fourth amendment analysis should not be guided by subtle property law distinctions).
8. 611 F.2d at 1345.
9. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978) (government may be able to contest defendant's standing in possessory offense).
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structures,' 0 it did not specify independent probable cause justifying a
search of each structure. While one affidavit and one warrant may sanction
the search of several places, probable cause must be shown for each location
to be searched.'' In the present case, however, the court of appeals consid-
ered that the buildings identified in the affidavit were but a single place,
because they were all used for one individual's residence or business. The
court concluded, therefore, that separate probable cause would not be re-
quired for each structure.
12
Rios was more successful in challenging the affidavit by claiming that
the affiant had made material and intentional misrepresentations. At trial,
the defendant offered to prove that the alleged criminal activity, which
formed the basis of probable cause, had not occurred at either the place
searched or at any of the other structures listed in the warrant. The district
court had found no reason to proceed beyond the face of the affidavit and
had refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.'3 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed on this point, holding that, in view of the substantial offer of
proof made and the significant questions raised, a hearing should have been
conducted to decide the issue.14
The Tenth Circuit ruling in Rios is undeniably correct in all of its as-
pects. It should be noted, however, that the automatic standing rule, which
allowed Rios to object to the search, has been limited by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Sa/vucci.'5 In Sa/vucci, the Court held that
"defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of
the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact
been violated."' 6 As a result, the current standing test permits a defendant
to assert a fourth amendment violation only when he can demonstrate a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place where the allegedly illegal
search or seizure occurred.' 7 If the Salvucci standard had been applied in
Rios, the defendant likely would have lacked standing since the court had
determined that the challenged search was neither at his home nor in a
structure in which Rios had a privacy interest.' 8
10. The buildings were a warehouse, a garage, a camping trailer, and a mobile home.
11. United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1974). See State v. Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714,
460 P.2d 244 (1969).
12. 611 F.2d at 1347 (dictum). Seegeneratly Williams v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 134, 240 P.2d
1132 (1952).
13. 611 F.2d at 1348.
14. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). See Comment, Franks v. Dela-
ware: Granting the Right to Challenge the Veracity of Search Warrant Affdavrts, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.
391 (1979).
The Tenth Circuit reversed on two additional grounds, finding 1) that it was error by the
trial court not to give a limiting instruction concerning the admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statements, 611 F.2d at 1339-4 1, and 2) that an improper closing argument had been made by
the prosecution, id. at 1341-43.
15. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). See also United States v. Montgomery, 621 F.2d 753 (10th Cir.
1980) (critiquing the automatic standing rule).
16. 100 S. Ct. at 2549. St Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
17. 100 S. Ct. at 2551 n.4. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-48 (1978).
18. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2559 (1980) (defendant did not have reason-
able expectation of privacy in a companion's purse); United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at
2555 (remanding for a determination of whether defendant had privacy expectation in mother's
home). But stee United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant had fourth
19811
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B. Probable Cause
In United States v. Diltz,19 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the factual
determination of whether there was probable cause to justify making the
defendant a "target" of a wiretap. 20 The supporting affidavit declared that
the main purpose of the wiretap was the acquisition of incriminating evi-
d.cc or a uspect inamed Bremson. The defendant, Diltz, was mentioned
only as one person with whom Bremson had been in contact over the phone.
Based in part on the evidence obtained from the wiretap, the defendant,
Diltz, was indicted and convicted of illegal drug distribution. Diltz argued
that he had always been a putative target and, since he had not been named
as such, no probable cause was shown to justify the wiretap involving him.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit court confined itself to the government's sixty-one
page affidavit to determine if there was probable cause to believe that the
defendant was engaged in illegal activities. The court concluded, in a rather
confusing opinion, that the evidence was "inconsequential and inconclusive
in establishing anything more than suspicions" that Diltz was engaged in
criminal activity.22 The court stated that the present standard for probable
cause is
the test which is set forth in Brthegar [v. United States] requiring that
the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge based on
reasonably trustworthy information be sufficient to warrant a man
of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed, ..... Sometimes it is said that it is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt, although less than evidence to justify
conviction.
23
The Tenth Circuit observed that hearsay may support the finding of
amendment rights in suitcase left in a friend's apartment); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d
322 (10th Cir. 1972) (defendant had fourth amendment rights in containers left in a friend's
attic).
19. 622 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1980).
20. The wiretap was instigated pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
21. 622 F.2d at 476-78. A person who has been the subject of a wiretap has four basic
rights under the Act: 1) the right to refuse to answer questions by the grand jury which are
based on illegally seized evidence; 2) the limited right to inspect intercepted communications;
3) the right to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence; and 4) the right to recover civil
damages for violation of title III. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(8), 2518(10)(a), 2520 (1976).
Defendant also claimed that the warrant was defective because of mistaken name identifi-
cation. Throughout the affidavit, the government had referred to the defendant as Robert
Diamos. Only later was it discovered that Robert Diltz was the same man. The court of ap-
peals dismissed defendant's contention that this name confusion rendered the wiretap illegal. It
found that the government had no reason to believe that Diltz and Diamos were the same man,
and that the name confusion had no effect on the determination of probable cause under the
affidavit. 622 F.2d at 479, 483.
22. 622 F.2d at 480. The majority opinion curiously dismissed United States v. Donovan,
429 U.S. 413 (1977), as irrelevant. Donovan had held that a failure to name all persons required
by statute was not an automatic constitutional violation requiring suppression of evidence. 429
U.S. at 436-40 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iv) (1976)).
23. 622 F.2d at 481. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). With respect to
search warrants, it has been said that "probable cause for a search warrant is nothing more than
a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the law enforce-
ment officer's affidavit." United States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 932 (1979).
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probable cause but emphasized that "[w]hat is needed are facts that speak
out as to the existence of probable cause. Whether the evidence is hearsay is
not significant, but if it is hearsay, it should be factual, relevant and also
trustworthy." 24 Since the government's supporting affidavit was based on
insufficient factual material, it failed to meet the test for probable cause.
25
In United States v. Matthews,26 two of the many fourth amendment issues
present also involved the determination of probable cause. Military police
became suspicious of the defendant, Matthews, when they noticed his car on
the military base. The car had military license plates, yet it was not painted
like a military car. During questioning, the police specifically asked for the
customary military "log book" which should have matched the license
plates. Matthews could not produce such a book. He did produce car regis-
tration, but the registration was for a Chevrolet, and the car in question was
a Ford. The defendant then was taken, with the car, to the military police
station for additional questioning.
2 7
The Tenth Circuit noted that police custodial detentions must be based
on probable cause, regardless of whether they technically constitute an ar-
rest. 28 The court found that there were sufficient grounds to justify the mili-
tary police in reasonably believing that an offense was being, or had been,
committed.29 The court of appeals found that probable cause was present in
that Matthews' civilian car bore military plates, a military log book corre-
sponding to the plates was absent, and the registration which Matthews pro-
duced was for a different make of car.
30
In Matthews, the Tenth Circuit court also addressed the question of
whether probable cause existed so as to justify a search of the car. Matthews'
car was searched for evidence of ownership at the time of his custodial inter-
rogation at the military police station. The court of appeals noted that for a
warrantless search to be proper, there must be both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances.
3
1
The appellate court observed that the probable cause requirement was
satisfied "when the officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or proba-
ble cause' to believe that they will find an instrumentality of a crime or
evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search."
'32
The court found probable cause for a search in the same facts which sup-
ported the probable cause for arrest. The court also found an exigent cir-
cumstance in the fact that the car was in a relatively public area, a military
base, where it was vulnerable to being taken. The search was further justi-
24. 622 F.2d at 483. See, e.g., People v. Quintana, 183 Colo. 81, 514 P.2d 1325 (1973);
People v. Leahy, 173 Colo. 339, 484 P.2d 778 (1970).
25. 622 F.2d at 483.
26. 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 1281, 1283.
28. Id. at 1284. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 215 (1979) (probable cause is
needed whenever the magnitude of an intrusion reaches a "crucial" level, regardless of the in-
trusion's label under state law). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
29. 615 F.2d at 1284. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
30. 615 F.2d at 1284.
31. Id. at 1287.
32. Id. (citing Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1968)).
1981]
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fled in that it preserved evidence and safeguarded the car's contents for the
true owner. 33 Consequently, all evidence used by the government in the
defendant's trial was deemed to have been obtained legally and was there-
fore not suppressible.
In United States v. Coker,34 the defendanti, Coker, was arrested and in-
dcted for unlawfully possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. The
Tenth Circuit was presented with the task of determining whether Goker's
warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause.
Police had discovered marijuana growing in a federal game reserve.
The police were told by informants that defendant was planning to harvest
the marijuana the following day. While both informants were considered
reliable, neither had personal knowledge of this information, but instead
were relying on the reports of others. The police watched the marijuana
patch and observed Coker in the general vicinity. Although freshly cut ma-
rijuana was found the next day, Coker was never seen at the patch. The
police subsequently spotted Coker's truck, being driven by Coker's wife, with
the defendant as a passenger. When Coker saw the police, he ducked down
in the seat in an attempt to avoid being seen. The police stopped the truck
and found that Coker was wet from the waist down and covered by plants,
stickers, and seeds. While the plant debris was not characteristic of any spe-
cific area of the wildlife refuge, there was a river running through the refuge
near the marijuana patch. The police placed Coker under arrest.
35
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that the govern-
ment had not met its burden of showing probable cause for the warrantless
arrest.3 6 The government failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
informants' rumor.37 There was also no direct evidence linking the defend-
ant to the cut marijuana or even to the marijuana patch. 38 Since a prudent
person would not be warranted in believing that Coker was committing an
offense, the court held that there was no probable cause to support the arrest.
33. Id. at 1287-88.
34. 599 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 951-53.
36. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless felony arrest may be
made on probable cause alone); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (lawfulness of
arrest depends on probable cause).
37. Informant information can form the basis of probable cause only if both the informant
and his source are shown to be reliable. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See United States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979); Livermore, The Draper-Spinelli ,Problem, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 945
(1979). Since, in this case, the informants themselves received only hearsay information about
Coker, the government did not meet the second prong of the test.
38. The opinion summarized the important facts in this manner:
Defendant was stopped because he ducked down in the car; he was arrested because he
had been seen in the general area of the marijuana patch, because the condition of his
person indicated he had been in the general area of the marijuana patch, and because
rumor had linked him to the patch.
599 F.2d at 952. But see id. at 953-54 (McWilliams, J., dissenting) (asserting that the facts did
support a finding of probable cause).
[Vol. 58:2
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C. Warrantless Searches
1. Personal Container Searches
In Un'tedStates v. Meier,39 the defendant, Meier, was arrested for driving
while intoxicated. Meier was taken to jail, and his car was towed to a stor-
age warehouse. Later, the car was searched and a backpack was found. The
police, without first obtaining a search warrant, searched the backpack and
discovered marijuana inside. The defendant was charged with unlawful pos-
session of a controlled substance.4 On appeal, Meier asserted that his
fourth amendment rights were violated by the warrantless search of his
backpack.
The inherent mobility of cars has been 'Considered an exigent circum-
stance, permitting a warrantless search. 41 When a suitcase or a backpack is
seized, however, the exigency of mobility is not present since the police exer-
cise exclusive control and dominion over the item. 42 In such a case, the
courts, in determining whether there has been a fourth amendment viola-
tion, will look at the degree of the defendant's expectation of privacy in the
container seized.4 3 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, saw this case
as the factual equivalent of Arkansas v. Sanders,44 where a warrantless search
of a suitcase was held to be in violation of the Constitution. The Tenth
Circuit explained that the definitive mark of containers with a high expecta-
tion of privacy are those which function "as a repository for personal items
when one wishes to transport them. ' '45 A backpack was found not signifi-
cantly dissimilar to a suitcase, and, therefore, the warrantless search was
deemed to have violated the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Krazk,46 the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Breitenstein,
decided the issue of whether a search warrant is required for the search of a
closed container located within another closed container. In this case, the
police had obtained a search warrant based upon probable cause that there
was a shotgun in the trunk of a car owned and used by a convicted felon.
The police opened the car's trunk but found no gun. They did, however,
find a closed suitcase. When the police opened the suitcase, they discovered
the shotgun underneath some clothing. The defendant argued that although
there was a search warrant for the car, there were no exigent circumstances
excusing the police from obtaining another warrant for a search of the suit-
case.
4 7
39. 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979).
40. Se 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976).
41. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (warrantless search of an automobile
justified because of inherent mobility of the car and possibility that evidence within the car may
disappear); United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S.
1080 (1979) (warrantless search of automobile justified by its inherent mobility when suspect
observed placing package of drugs inside). See Colorado v. Bannister, 101 S. Ct. 42 (1980).
42. 602 F.2d at 255.
43. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (higher degree of privacy ex-
pected in contents of double-locked footlocker taken from trunk of car than in car itself).
44. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
45. 602 F.2d at 255 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)).
46. 611 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1979), cer. dented, 445 U.S. 953 (1980).
47. Id. at 345.
19811
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The Tenth Circuit held that only one warrant was needed for both the
car and the suitcase. The court distinguished Arkansas v. Sanders48 and United
States v. Chadwick49 by noting that the searches challenged in those cases
were conducted without any search warrant at all. In the instant case, there
was a valid warrant authorizing the search of the car. The court of appeals
also rejected defendant's contention that a warrant, to withstand judicial
scrutiny, must precisely identify all things to be searcsed, that is, both a car
and a suitcase when such items are to be searched. An additional warrant
was declared not to be necessary "for each container within a larger
container when the warrant covers the search of the larger for a specified
item."50
In United States v. Rengifo-Castro,51 the defendant's vehicle was stopped
by the border patrol at some distance from the Mexican border. Neither the
defendant, who initially claimed Panamanian citizenship, nor a passenger,
had a passport. Later, both individuals claimed to be from Columbia. They
were taken to a nearby office for further questioning. In the office, each
suspect was "directed to identify his suitcase, open it, and sit back down."
'5 2
A search of the defendant's open suitcase uncovered cocaine, and subse-
quently, he was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to distribute.
The Tenth Circuit court found that the warrantless search of the suit-
cases violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The court noted
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal lug-
gage.53 The appellate court reasoned that since the border agents had com-
plete control over the suitcases, there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless search, even if there had been probable cause.
54
The defendant's conviction was reversed.
55
2. Airplane Searches
The defendant in Untied States v. Gooch56 contended that his conviction
for unlawful possession of marijuana was based upon illegally seized evi-
48. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
49. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 43 supra.
50. 611 F.2d at 345. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(b) (1978) (warrant
sufficiently describing premises need not particularly describe receptacles therein where per-
sonal effects may be found).
51. 620 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 232.
53. Id. at 233. Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he had not been
stopped at the border checkpoint. Cf Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(border searches of vehicles without probable cause or consent invalid anywhere but at the
border or its functional equivalent). Of course, if this had been a border search, the border
patrol would have had the authority to search the defendant's luggage on less than probable
cause. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1976). See also Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979)
(dictum) (searches of personal baggage required to determine if belongings are entitled to enter
the country).
54. 620 F.2d at 232. But see United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar, 495 F.2d 678 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974) (border patrol agent, not at the border, permitted to conduct a
warrantless search of a suitcase on probable cause). While Nearez-Alcantar apparently is incon-
sistent with the present case, the probable explanation for the holding is that it was decided
before Chadwick and Sanders. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
55. 620 F.2d at 233.
56. 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 58:2
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dence. Defendant's airplane had been detected by radar and tracked by
United States Customs officials. When the plane landed, the defendant
jumped out and began running away, as the plane turned to take off. The
plane was stopped, and the defendant and the pilot were arrested. The sub-
sequent warrantless search of the plane resulted in the discovery of over
1,100 pounds of marijuana.
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit noted that it was the government's
burden to justify a warrantless search.57 The police had claimed that they
observed, through an open door, "several large bags and smelled marijuana
coming from the interior of the airplane. '58 The government argued that
this was sufficient probable cause to justify a search under the Chambers v.
Maroney rule.
59
The Tenth Circuit agreed. The Chambers decision held that the inher-
ent mobility of automobiles constitutes an exigent circumstance which per-
mits a warrantless search, if the search is based on probable cause. 6° The
Tenth Circuit had previously held that the exigent circumstances exception
is equally applicable to airplanes, because of the lesser expectation of privacy
and extreme mobility associated with an airplane.
6
1
The court of appeals also addressed the search of the bags found in the
plane. The court observed "that the sacks which contained the marijuana
were mere cargo rather than personal luggage."'62 Since no affirmative steps
were taken to isolate the cargo, the court assumed that there was a lesser
degree of privacy expected in the bags containing marijuana than in a brief-
case, which also had been searched.63 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, upheld
this warrantless search and affirmed its findings in a short opinion issued
after rehearing.
6 4
3. Controlled Delivery Searches
United States v. Andrews 65 was a significant opinion with regard to "con-
trolled delivery" searches and seizures. The facts indicated that a man
presented a package to an airline cargo service in Miami and requested that
it be shipped to Denver. The airline employee, suspicious of the manner in
which it was wrapped, opened the package.66 He found cocaine inside and
57. Id. at 124 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
58. 603 F.2d at 123.
59. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See United States v. Soto, 591 F.2d 1091, 1099 (5th Cir.), cert.
dented, 442 U.S. 930 (1979) (probable cause existed to justify search of a heavily-loaded van
stopped near area of smuggling activities when odor of inarijuana was detected).
60. 399 U.S. at 51. But see Judge McKay's comment: "To the extent that mobility rather
than privacy is the key in this area, it is troubling that inherent as opposed to actual mobility is
determinative." 603 F.2d at 125 n.3. See also Colorado v. Bannister, 101 S. Ct. 42 (1980).
61. United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974).
62. 603 F.2d at 125. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
63. 603 F.2d at 126. The Tenth Circuit invalidated the briefcase search. Id. at 125-26.
64. id. at 126.
65. 618 F.2d 646 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 84 (1980). Set also United States v.
Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1979) (similar facts).
66. The airline employee was suspicious because packages sent by corporations normally
were packed in cardboard boxes, personalized with a printed corporation trademark. This
1981]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
notified the police. The police called a Denver agent of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA), and it was decided that the Miami police
would remove a small quantity of cocaine, reseal the package, and send it to
Denver. When the package arrived in Denver, the DEA agent took custody
of it. The next morning, defendant Andrews presented himself to claim the
package. The DEA agent, posing as nn -irlin, employee, took A-dr--
aside, and told him that he knew that drugs were inside the package and
that he wanted money in return for not telling the police. Andrews paid,
took the package, and was arrested when he left the airport building. The
agent retrieved the package and removed the cocaine.
Andrews was charged with possession of a controlled substance. 67 He
moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the package was opened
without a search warrant, in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The
trial court suppressed the evidence, and the government took an interlocu-
tory appeal. Since the initial search was purely private, not subject to fourth
amendment protection, 68 the basic issue was whether the reopening of the
package after Andrews' arrest was a continuation of the first legal search or a
new, second search. 69 Andrews argued that the latter was the case, claiming
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package after it was
delivered to him.
The Tenth Circuit, in a well reasoned opinion by Judge Barrett, held
that the series of actions constituted a single search, legal at its inception.70
UniledStates v. Ford,7 ' a case with similar facts, 72 was cited in support of the
majority opinion. The Ford court had held that an authorization to ship
contraband was an initial act of police dominion and control, dominion
which was maintained continuously by close surveillance until physical pos-
session was reasserted after the arrest. 73 The Andrews majority found the
same official dominion and control to be present. 74 The court of appeals
also discounted the existence of any privacy expectation after the DEA agent
package identified the sender as a corporation but was wrapped in brown paper with all desig-
nations handwritten. 618 F.2d at 648.
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
68. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable governmental intrusions, not
against the acts of private individuals, unless they are working as government agents. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921). Therefore, a search made by a common carrier, on its
own initiative, does not come within the ambit of the fourth amendment. United States v.
Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1979) (search by airline employee not governmental action);
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert dented, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); People v. Benson, 176 Colo. 421, 490 P.2d
1287 (1971) (seizures by non-governmental personnel not suppressible).
69. 618 F.2d at 651.
70. Id. at 654.
71. 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975).
72. An airline employee, in California, discovered heroin in a package addressed to
Oklahoma City. Police in both jurisdictions cooperated in tracing the package and arresting
the defendant when he claimed it. Id. at 1311.
73. The Ford court emphasized that the airline officials could not have shipped the contra-
band without government authorization. Id.
74. A different situation would have arisen if the government had lost control of the pack-
age. Instead of simply retrieving the package when Andrews was arrested, the government
agents would have had to have made a new intrusion into Andrews' privacy. Such an intrusion
would have required a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.
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informed the defendant that he knew the package contained drugs. 75 Since
the whole transaction was but one search, the district court's grant of the
motion to suppress was reversed.
76
In an equally thoughtful opinion, Judge Seymour dissented from the
majority's analysis and from the previous holding in Ford. The judge rea-
soned that it was incongruous for the majority to hold that the cocaine was
in the "dominion and control" of the police when Andrews was charged with
a crime of possession. 77 Furthermore, Judge Seymour disagreed with the
proposition that a search conducted "by different police in a different state
at a different time" could be a continuation of a previous search. 78 Finally,
Judge Seymour noted that "certainly an individual's expectation of privacy
in a sealed package is as legitimate as his expectation of privacy in an un-
locked suitcase."' 79 She argued that this privacy expectation was evident
from the fact that Andrews actually paid money to the DEA agent to keep
the information private.80 Judge Seymour concluded that the motion to
suppress should have been upheld.
4. Open Field--Curtilege
United States v. Carra8a arose from a situation where a state narcotics
agent had information that land leased by the defendant, Carra, contained a
substantial crop of marijuana. The agent observed that the marijuana was
growing within a fenced area behind the defendant's home. One of the
questions confronting the Tenth Circuit court on appeal was whether there
was an illegal search and seizure when the agent picked and left with a mari-
juana leaf.8 2 The agent testified that the leaf was protruding through the
fence at the time it was seized. The court, per Judge McKay, held that the
75. 618 F.2d at 652. It is questionable whether a stranger's knowledge of the contents of an
otherwise personal container would destroy one's reasonable expectation of privacy. A better
analysis, producing the same result in this case, might be that Andrews had a lesser expectation
of privacy by using a public carrier to transport his package. Cf Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974) (use of motor vehicles on public thoroughfares creates an expectation of privacy
which is less than the privacy expected in homes).
76. 618 F.2d at 654.
77. Id See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960) (government may not assert
that defendant possessed illegal goods for conviction and simultaneously deny such possession
for fourth amendment protections) with United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2552 (1980)
(prosecution may charge defendant with criminal possession and nevertheless deny that defend-
ant has standing to claim fourth amendment violation). See also United States v. Jackson, 588
F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (constructive possession of a controlled
substance need not be exclusive; government must prove defendant's dominion and control over
the drug); United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1979) (constructive possession may
be joint or exclusive).
78. 618 F.2d at 655. But set United States v. DeBerrey, 487 F.2d 448, 451 n.4 (2d Cir.
1973).
79. 618 F.2d at 655 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)). See Walter v. United
States, 100 S. Ct. 2395 (1980) (sealed package in mail); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
16 (1977) (foot locker); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 125-26 (10th Cir. 1979) (brief-
case).
80. 618 F.2d at 648, 655-56.
81. 604 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir.), cert. deneid, 444 U.S. 994 (1979).
82. On the basis of the plucked marijuana leaf, a warrant was obtained for a more thor-
ough search of the house and yard. Firearms were found, and the defendant was convicted of
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search was not illegal because the leaf was in an "open field," outside of the
"curtilege" of the house.8 3
The Tenth Circuit did not cite any authority for its holding,
8 4 and the
analysis in Carra disregards the Supreme Court's observation that the
"fourth amendment protects persons, not places." 8 5 While the open fields-
curtilege. dichotomy and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard may
produce similar results, this is not always true. For example., if a person
allows marijuana to grow on his front porch, certainly the marijuana is
within the curtilege of his house, but he could not have the reasonable expec-
tation that a passerby would not observe his plants.8 6 Conversely, if mari-
juana were growing in an open field, hundreds of yards from the nearest
farmhouse, with fences prohibiting one's view and "No Trespassing" signs
posted, a search warrant would be needed since the occupants of the land
had taken all reasonable precautions to protect their privacy in that area.
8 7
It is apparent, therefore, that the terms "curtilege" and "open field" cannot
be used "in some talismanic sense or as a substitute for reasoned analysis."
88
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not make a specific determination
of whether Carra had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated
by the picking of the marijuana leaf. Such an analysis would have required
resolving such issues as whether the marijuana could have been seen from
adjoining lands and whether the landlord's permission justified the agent's
entry on property leased by the defendant.
illegal possession of firearms and for making false statements in the acquisition of a firearm. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1), 924(a) (1976).
83. 604 F.2d at 1272-73.
84. Cf Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (fourth amendment protection does not
extend to open fields); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1955) (fourth amendment
applies to buildings within the curtilege, but not to open fields).
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See United States v. Salvucci, 100 S.
Ct. 2547, 2552-53 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
86. United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
87. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a) (1978) (citing Commonwealth v.
Janek, 242 Pa. Super. 380, 363 A.2d 1299 (1976)).
88. United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1979). See note 7 supra and ac-
companying text. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(d) (1978) where it is
stated that:
One of the virtues of Katz v. United States is that it makes it apparent that the
curtilege concept should not be employed to arbitrarily limit the reach of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Under Katz, it is a search to violate "the privacy upon
which [one] justifiably relied," and unquestionably a person can have such an expecta-
tion of privacy as to garages and barns and the like even when they are not in "close
proximity" to his dwelling.
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II. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Custodial Interrogation of a Juvenile8 9
In United States v. Palmer,9° defendant Palmer, a seventeen-year old juve-
nile was convicted, under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 9 ' of aiding and
abetting an assault on a car and its occupants. Palmer and his friends had
attacked a car by smashing the windows and headlights, slashing the tires,
and beating the car body with pipes. The car's driver was stabbed to death
while several other occupants were seriously injured.
92
The following day, a policeman appeared at Palmer's home and told his
mother that Palmer would be picked up after school for questioning. Ac-
cording to Palmer's mother, the policeman also said that she could not be
present at the questioning. The policeman testified that the mother gave
permission to the police to question her son. Later that same day, the police-
man tried again to contact the mother but was unsuccessful. The mother
did not try to reach her son. During the questioning of the defendant, the
mother was not present. Defendant Palmer refused to sign a waiver of his
Miranda rights, but he did make a statement.
93
The general issue confronting the Tenth Circuit concerned the compe-
tency of a minor to make, without the guidance of a parent or attorney, an
intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, per Judge Breitenstein, observed that "admissibility of statements ob-
tained during custodial interrogation requires 'inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.' -94 The court concluded that
Palmer's waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and it upheld the ad-
missibility of the policeman's testimony regarding Palmer's statement. 95
The Tenth Circuit was swayed by the fact that Miranda rights were read to
Palmer, that he understood them, and that he did not request a lawyer or his
mother's presence at the questioning.
Judge McKay dissented. He noted that for a waiver of constitutional
89. Within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit enumerated the basic factors it will look
to when analyzing whether "interrogation" took place in a custodial or non-custodial setting.
"These factors are 1) whether there is probable cause to arrest, 2) the subjective intent of the
police, 3) the subjective belief of the defendant, and 4) the focus of the investigation." United
States v. Clay, No. 77-2009, slip op. at 35 (10th Cir. June 9, 1979).
90. 604 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976).
92. 604 F.2d at 65.
93. Id. at 66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. 604 F.2d at 67 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)). The Supreme Court
has listed the many factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's
waiver, including the age, education, background, and intelligence of the minor, the juvenile's
capacity to understand the warning given, and his appreciation of the consequences of waiving
constitutional rights. 442 U.S. at 725. See also West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1968); State v. Hinkle, 206 Kan. 472, 479 P.2d 869 (1971).
95. 604 F.2d at 67. The Supreme Court, in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), held
that although a juvenile's request to see his probation officer did not invoke his fifth amendment
rights, a request for an attorney did call forth such rights. 442 U.S. at 718-22. The Tenth
Circuit did not mention whether a request for a parent is comparable to a request for a proba-
tion officer or to a request for an attorney. But see, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I)
(1973) (requiring parent's or attorney's presence during police questioning ofjuvenile). Seegener-
ally People v. Patrick Steven W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615, 163 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980).
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safeguards to be valid, a defendant must have the capacity to execute a
knowing and intelligent waiver,96 and he argued that "incapacity should be
presumed in the case of a minor."' 97 Judge McKay thought that the govern-
ment had failed to meet its burden of showing the requisite mental capacity,
thus rendering defendant's statement inadmissible.98
B. Due Process
1. Pre-Indictment Delay
In United States v. Comosona,99 the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether
the due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated considering the
fact that the defendant was indicted 435 days after the crime was commit-
ted. 60 The Tenth Circuit held that it was appropriate to apply a balancing
test in cases of pre-indictment delay. In balancing the rights of the defend-
ant against the tardy actions of the state, the following elements must be
evaluated:
First, there must be demonstration of actual prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay. Generally, such prejudice will
take the form of either a loss of witnesses and/or physical evidence
or the impairment of their effective use at trial. Second, the length
of delay must be considered. Finally, the Government's reason for
the delay must be carefully considered.101
The court also set out the method of proof:
Upon a prirnafacie showing of fact by a defendant that the delay
in charging him has actually prejudiced his ability to defend, and
that this delay was intentionally or purposefully designed and pur-
sued by the Government to gain some tactical advantage over or to
harrass him, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts
to the Government. Once the Government presents evidence
showing that the delay was not improperly motivated or unjusti-
fied, the defendant then bears the ultimate burden of establishing
the Government's due process violation by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1
0 2
Since Comosona failed to show any prejudice to his ability to defend as a
96. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (defendant needs to know his
legal rights and understand the consequences of waiver for the waiver to be knowing and volun-
tary).
97. 604 F.2d at 68.
98. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1975) (the younger the age
of the minor, the greater is the government's responsibility to provide counseling by a parent or
an attorney).
99. 614 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1980). Also decided within this survey period was United
States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979) (five month delay, during which witness
died, not prejudicial).
100. The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial does not vest until a person has been
arrested or indicted. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307 (1971). Therefore, protection against pre-indictment delay is governed by statutes
of limitations and by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 322-24.
101. 614 F.2d at 696. It has been stated that a defendant must show actual and substantial
prejudice to establish a due process violation. See, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978).
102. 614 F.2d at 696-97.
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result of the pre-indictment delay, his efforts to make a prima facie showing
of a due process deprivation were unavailing. 10 3 His conviction was af-
firmed.
2. Deprivation of Life and Liberty
The due process claims which arose in Yanez v. Romero 104 stemmed from
a confrontation between defendant and police officers. Upon observing de-
fendant, Yanez, enter a service station restroom, the police burst into the
restroom and found a used hypodermic needle and fresh needle marks on the
arm of Yanez. Yanez was arrested and transported to a hospital, where he
refused a police request to give a urine sample until threatened with cathe-
terization. Based on evidence obtained from the urine sample, Yanez was
convicted of unlawful possession of morphine. After challenging his convic-
tion through all possible state forums, Yanez sought a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court.
Defendant's first contention was that he had been criminally punished
because of his status as a drug addict, in violation of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Robinson v. Caifornia. 105 The Robinson Court held that while posses-
sion of narcotics was punishable, drug addiction was a disease and, as such,
could not be made a crime. 10 6 Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit,
compared the Robinson ruling with the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v.
Texas, 10 7 in which the Court upheld a conviction based on a public
drunkenness statute. Judge Doyle concluded that the conviction in this case
was more similar to Powell than to Robinson, and, therefore, valid.' 018
Defendant's second contention was that the production of the urine
sample violated his fifth amendment rights under the rule of Rochtn v. Califor-
n'a.10 9 In the Rochi case, evidence of narcotics was obtained by the forcible
pumping of the defendant's stomach. The Tenth Circuit characterized
Rochi'n as an extraordinary case, restricted to its set of facts.I 10 Instead, the
court of appeals found this case more akin to Schmerber v. Californa, "I where
103. Id. at 697. For examples of other unsuccessful attempts to show prejudice as a result of
pre-indictment delay see United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1978) (loss or "dim-
ming" of memory); United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1978) (unavailability of
witnesses); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (death of victim); United States
v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 862 (1977) (loss of evidence).
The length of pre-indictment delay seems to have little effect on the grant or denial of a
due process claim. Courts have denied claims when the delay has been one year, Arnold v.
McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978), three years, United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779
(7th Cir. 1977), and four years, United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979). A due
process claim has been dismissed in a case where the government had waited to file charges until
only a few hours before a five year statute of limitations would have run, United States v.
Parker, 586 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. 619 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
106. Id. at 666.
107. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
108. 619 F.2d at 852. Based on evidence from the urine sample, Yanez was convicted, not
for the status of addiction, but for possession of morphine. Id. at 85 1.
109. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
110. 619 F.2d at 854.
111. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the Supreme Court upheld the unconsented withdrawal of blood on the ba-
sis of the existence of probable cause to arrest. In distinguishing Rochin, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the urine sample demand and the arrest in the
present case were based on the solid ground of probable cause., 12 Since
there was probable cause to arrest and since there was no actual use of cathe-
terization, the admissibility of the evidence was sustained." 
3
Judge McKay, in a vigorous dissent, found that the threat of catheteri-
zation violated all canons of decency and fairness. He stated that "it would
astound me if our law approved official threats of the type of indecencies
condemned in Rochin, while disapproving only actual consummation of the
threatened indignities."
' "14
Yanez exemplifies the inherent conflict between Rochin and Schmerber. In
all three cases, there had been probable cause to search. The police in Rochin
had observed pills being swallowed, in Schmerber they had observed drunken-
ness, and in Yanez the police had observed a used hypodermic needle and
fresh needle marks. In all three cases, the police had obtained evidence of a
crime by using intrusive medical procedures without the truly voluntary
consent of the defendant.
The factors distinguishing Rochin from Schmerber may be found in Jus-
tice Frankfurter's statement that the facts in Rochin represented "conduct
that shocked one's conscience."' '5 The totality of the shocking circum-
stances in Rochin included the police entrance into the defendant's home
without a warrant, the forcible entrance into the defendant's bedroom while
he and his wife were in bed, and the pumping of his stomach to retrieve pills
wanted as evidence. Although the police may have had probable cause to
arrest the defendant and an exigent circumstance in the need to preserve
evidence, this probable cause had arisen from a violation of basic constitu-
tional rights.' 16
In contrast, the totality of the circumstances in Schmerber were not as
offensive or shocking. There was no violation of a highly held privacy right,
for defendant was in the hospital immediately after, and as a result of, his
car accident. The police arrested defendant shortly after he committed the
crime of driving while intoxicated. The medical procedure for withdrawing
blood is significantly less offensive than pumping one's stomach.
Yanez lies somewhere between Rochin and Schmerber. In Yanez, the police
burst into a public restroom and, like the situation in Rochin, probably vio-
lated defendant's justifiable expectation of privacy." 17 Unlike the case in
112. 619 F.2d at 854.
113. Id. at 855-56.
114. Id. at 856 (McKay, J., dissenting).
115. 342 U.S. at 172.
116. Perhaps the result in Rochtn also can be reached by applying the later developed "fruit
of the poisonous tree" analysis. Any evidence obtained by the "shocking" conduct of pumping
Rochin's stomach might also have been suppressible because it was acquired as a direct result of
a patently illegal entry into Rochin's home. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-
87 (1963). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrant needed to enter a sus-
pect's home to make felony arrest).
117. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3rd 884, 506
P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973), ovemruledon othergrounds, People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891,
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Roche'n, however, the privacy expected in a public restroom is not the same as
that expected in one's own bedroom. And while catheterization is as offen-
sive as stomach pumping, unlike the Rochin situation, in Yanez there was only
a threat to use a catheter.'l 8 Truly then, this case is a hybrid of the Rochtn-
Schmerber fact pattern and perhaps the only resolution available in such a
case is each judge's determination of what "shocks" his legal and personal
conscience.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Ea ffct'e Assistance of Counsel
In Dyer v. Crisp,119 the Tenth Circuit, in an en bane decision, held that
effective assistance of counsel is accomplished when a criminal "defense
counsel exercises the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney."'1 20 Judge Doyle, writing for the court, noted that all of
the circuits, save the Secondt12  and Tenth,122 had abandoned the "sham,
farce, and mockery" test'
23 for the stricter "reasonably competent" test.
12 4
The Tenth Circuit in this case decided that the more stringent standard
would better fulfill the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.
While the new test is stated clearly in this opinion, its proper procedural
application in the Tenth Circuit remains an open question. Some circuits
have ruled that once the defendant presents a prima facie case showing at-
torney ineffectiveness, prejudice to the defendant is presumed, and the bur-
587 P.2d 232, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1978); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800
(1970); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(c) (1978) (surveillance of a closed restroom
constitutes a fourth amendment search).
118. The majority opinion stated that catheterization "is nevertheless an undesirable prac-
tice which ultimately is likely to produce a fact situation which will be ruled shocking and
unlawful." 619 F.2d at 854.
119. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). The sixth amendment's
guarantee of right to assistance of counsel means right to effective assistance. McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
Also during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided Brown v. Shi09, which held that,
for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, court-appointed attorneys do not
act under the color of state law as required in section 1983 actions. 614 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1980). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In addition, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a Kansas recoup-
ment statute, which provided that criminal defendant's were liable for the fees of court-ap-
pointed counsel, was unconstitutional. Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1979). See also
ia'. at 155 (guidelines for reviewing recoupment statutes).
120. 613 F.2d at 278. See, e.g., Erickson, Standards of Corpeiencyfor Defense Counsel in a Criminal
Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1979); Finer, Ineciive Assisiace of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1077 (1973); Gard, Inadequate Assistance of Counsel-Siandards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV.
483 (1976); Note, Identifing and Remedying Inejkcie Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel- A New
Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980); Note, Current Standards for
Determining Inective Assistance of Counsel; Still a Sham, Farce or Mocker?, 1979 So. ILL. UNIV. L.J.
132. See also, Dear, Adversagy Review.- An Expernent in Performance Evaluation, 57 DEN. L.J. 401
(1980).
121. E.g., Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977). See Brinkley v. Lefevre, 621 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting and
advocating reversal of the farce and mockery standard).
122. E.g., Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977).
123. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
124. 613 F.2d at 276-78.
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den shifts to the government to show the lack of prejudice.' 25 Other circuits
require that the defendant prove both incompetence of counsel and resulting
prejudice. ' 2 6 The procedures applicable to the new test in the Tenth Circuit
will have to await future opinions.'
2 7
B. -;/"r ' t..... JRght o Trial by Jury
In United States v. Dubozse, 128 the Tenth Circuit held that a juvenile is not
entitled to a jury trial under the Juvenile Delinquency Act.' 2 9 The defend-
ant, Duboise, an Indian boy of sixteen, was charged with the murder of a
teenage acquaintance. Although the defendant did not request to be tried as
an adult, he did make a motion for a jury trial. The motion was denied, and
the federal district court judge found Duboise to be delinquent. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that his right to a jury trial could not be waived by
his simply electing to be tried in accordance with the Juvenile Delinquency
Act. 130
As originally enacted, the Act contained an express provision preclud-
ing jury trial; the current Act merely says that a juvenile will be tried as such
unless the youth requests to be tried as an adult.13' In McKever v. Penn-
sylvanza,13 2 the United States Supreme Court held that due process did not
require a jury trial in state juvenile delinquency proceedings.133 The Court,
however, has never decided specifically whether the federal government
could preclude jury trial in Delinquency Act proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that McKeiver, nevertheless, controlled the out-
come of the case. 13 4 The McKeiver opinion indicated that a jury was not a
prerequisite to accurate factfinding, and that the informal nature ofjuvenile
proceedings might be better suited to protecting and rehabilitating youthful
offenders. 135 In addition to agreeing with the Supreme Court's rationale,
125. United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
126. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979);
United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
127. For a helpful and specific delineation of the various standards of conduct, which give
structure and meaning to the "reasonably effective assistance" test, see ABA PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (approved draft 1970).
128. 604 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1979).
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5042 (1976).
130. 604 F.2d at 648-50.
131. Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 857 (1948) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (1976)). Section 5032 also provides that the Attorney General may, by motion,
transfer the juvenile's case to state court for criminal prosecution, provided that the case in-
volves a juvenile, over sixteen, who has committed a major felony.
132. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
133. The decision in AcKtever did not change statutory or case law providing jury trials in
juvenile proceedings. Most states in the Tenth Circuit do furnish juveniles with the possibility
of a jury trial. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(4) (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(a)
(Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § I 110 (Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1977). See
also Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33
(1953) (jury not provided).
134. 604 F.2d at 652.
135. 403 U.S. at 543-48.
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the Tenth Circuit noted that the Act left defendant the option of being tried
as an adult, with a jury.' 36 The court held that there was therefore no right
to a jury trial under the Juvenile Delinquency Act.
137
C. Juo, Prejudtce
In United States v. Greer,' 38 the Tenth Circuit held that juror contact
with a United States Marshal required reversal of a defendant's conviction.
At a recess during defendant Greer's trial, a juror asked a marshal a question
on sentencing in an unrelated case. During another recess, the juror and the
marshal continued the conversation and discussed sentencing under the Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) in general. 139 Apparently, upon over-
hearing this dialogue, a second juror asked a general question as to the
applicability of the FYCA to yet another unrelated case, to which the mar-
shal responded that the FYCA did apply. 14
These conversations were reported by another juror to the trial judge,
who immediately held an evidentiary hearing on the matter.14 ' It was de-
termined that six of the jurors did not know of the conversation, three jurors
remembered hearing some generalized comments on the FYCA but not in
reference to defendant Greer, and the remaining three jurors had partici-
pated in the conversation with the marshal. 142 The trial court found that
the conversations did not prejudice Greer in any manner, but the judge gave
cautionary instructions to the jury.1 43 The defendant was later convicted of
federal drug violations.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McKay, reversed the trial court and re-
manded for a new trial. Judge McKay noted the fundamental importance
of an impartial jury. He cited the Supreme Court case of Remmer v. United
States' 44 to the effect that "[a]ny private contact with jurors during trial
about the matter pending before them is 'presumptively prejudicial.' ",t45
Under the Remmer ruling, the government has the burden of showing
that third party contact with a juror was harmless to the defendant.146 This
procedure is difficult to apply when considered with Federal Rule of Evi-
136. 604 F.2d at 651-52.
137. Accord, United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Torres,
500 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Salcido-Medina, 483 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973); United States v. King, 482 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1076 (1973); Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971).
138. 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980). This case may have limited precedential value in light
of the fact that each judge on the panel wrote a separate opinion.
139. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5042 (1976).
140. 620 F.2d at 1384.
141. The failure to question a jury when there is a reasonable belief of the presence of
prejudice may be a denial of the sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. See Aston
v. Warden, 574 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1978). See generally United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,
145-146 (1936).
142. 620 F.2d at 1389-90 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1390.
144. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
145. 620 F.2d at 1385 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. at 229). See also United
States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
146. 347 U.S. at 229.
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dence 606(b).14 7 Rule 606(b) essentially states that jurors are not allowed to
testify to any matter, statement, or component of their deliberation proc-
ess. 14 8 This prohibition of juror testimony as to the juror's state of mind
when combined with the analysis used in Remmer, prompted Judge McKay
to conclude that the "presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome once a
jury has reached its verdict."'
' 49
Judge Doyle concurred with the result in Greer but he felt that the pre-
sumption of prejudice was a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive
one. 150 The judge found that the trial court in this case had violated rule
606(b).'15 Judge Doyle read this rule as allowing only juror testimony as to
whether there had been prejudicial information, and not, as the trial judge
permitted, evidence as to its effect on the jury.' 52 This type of testimony
required reversal.
Judge Barrett dissented. He emphasized that the trial judge was in the
best position to determine what is prejudicial to the jury, and his findings in
these matters should be given great weight and deference.1 53 Judge Barrett
felt that the trial judge's findings were supported in this case. In his discus-
sions with the jurors, the marshal had never referred to the defendant or to
the possible sentence Greer might receive if found guilty. In addition, the
jurors were specifically instructed and admonished that sentencing was ex-
clusively the court's function and was not to be considered in arriving at
their verdict. 1'5 4 Judge Barrett argued that the majority decision discarded
ninety years of Supreme Court precedent.' 55 The dissenting judge pointed
147. Once an extrinsic influence on the jury has been reporied, it is proper for the judge to
presume that it is prejudicial and to conduct a hearing. See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denid, 435 U.S. 924 (1978) (hearing should be held immediately upon
learning of an intrusion). Since rule 606(b) prohibits inquiry into the actual eet of the influ-
ence, the judge must evaluate the irregularity and determine whether it would probably have a
prejudicial effect sufficient to require requiring a mistrial. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77,
83 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 148 itnfra. A trial judge cannot examine the mental processes of
the jurors, but he can receive evidence on the existence of conditions or events which may show
prejudice. Maddox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (juror may testify as to the exist-
ence of any extraneous influence although not as to how that influence operated on his mind).
148. FED. R. EvID. 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as
to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to
the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's at-
tention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
149. 620 F.2d at 1385.
150. Id. at 1386.
151. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
152. 620 F.2d at 1387 (Doyle, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 1388.
154. Id. at 1389. See United States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 866 (1977) (trial judge's repeated instructions to the jury not to talk about the case, among
themselves or with others, negated any prejudice which may have arisen when juror attempted
to question marshal).
155. Id. at 1391. See Maddox v. United States, 147 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) (communications
between jurors and third persons are forbidden, "unless their harmlessness is made to appear").
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out that if the conclusive presumption of prejudice standard were the court's
holding, the Tenth Circuit would be the only federal circuit so holding.' 56
IV. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Right to Parole
In Shirley v. Chestnut,'5 7 the Tenth Circuit considered the claims of a
group of inmates from various Oklahoma prisons. The inmates asserted that
due process was ignored when they were denied parole. Specifically, the in-
mates sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that due process
"requires published criteria for parole release, access to adverse material in
inmate files, [the] right to subpoena witnesses at the [parole] hearing, and
written reasons for the denial of parole."' 58 The Tenth Circuit found that
these claims were comparable to those presented in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex 159 and, therefore, the court of appeals
applied the principles articulated in that case.
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court found that the Nebraska law outlining
parole standards codified a liberty interest protectable by due process.1
60
The Nebraska statutes entitle each inmate to a parole review every year. At
the hearing, the inmate may present any oral or written evidence and may
be represented by counsel. The parole board interviews the inmate and re-
views his record. Thereafter, the Nebraska parole board must release an eli-
gible prisoner unless it finds at least one of four statutory reasons for denying
parole. If denied parole, the prisoner is given a written explanation. 161
Although this statutory scheme created a legitimate expectation of pa-
role, entitled to due process protection, 62 the Supreme Court emphasized
that the Nebraska system of parole was unique. "Whether any other state
statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case
basis."' 63 The important issue, therefore, in Shirley v. Chestnut was the evalu-
ation of the rights and procedures provided in the Oklahoma parole system.
The Oklahoma statutes provide for automatic review of each inmate on
or before the expiration of one-third of his term. 164 At the parole hearing,
the inmate may present evidence and be represented by counsel. Unlike the
Nebraska system, however, the Oklahoma statutes do not provide that the
parole board "shall" release a prisoner "unless" a statutorily designated rea-
son is found; nor does the Oklahoma parole system require specific criteria to
be considered.' 6 5 "The Board's only statutory guidance in the exercise of its
156. See, e.g., Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
157. 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 806.
159. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
160. Id. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Nebraska statutes provided, of them-
selves, sufficient due process protections. Id. at 13-16.
161. Id. at 4-5; NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1-114(1) (1971).
162. Cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoner with cognizable liberty interest
entitled to procedural due process).
163. 442 U.S. at 12.
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 332 (1971).
165. Id See generally Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977)
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discretion is that it act as the public interest requires, and the sole existing
statutory criteria dictate only the time of parole consideration.' 166 Because
of these distinctions, the Tenth Circuit found that, unlike Greenholtz, the
Oklahoma parole statute did not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest, protected by due process, and the court of appeals denied the relief
sought by the inmates.
16 7
B. Access to the Courts
In the case of Battle v. Anderson, 16' the Tenth Circuit reviewed the ques-
tion of whether furnishing prisoners with a law library but denying them
access to civilian legal advisors violated the mandates of Bounds v. Smit'h.'
69
The Supreme Court, in Bounds, held that a prison system must provide pris-
oners with reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the
law. 170 Such access was deemed necessary to fulfill the due process require-
ment that persons have adequate, effective, and meaningful representation
in the courts.' 7 '
Since prison riots in 1973, the federal district court has supervised the
resolution of such issues as over-crowding, sanitation, fire-safety, water, ven-
tilation, and sewage systems within the Oklahoma penal system. This ap-
peal was a product of a district court finding, pursuant to Bounds, that
prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts is a desirable and neces-
sary goal; a goal usually neglected in the state's penal system. 172 The district
court had ordered that both an adequate library system and competent civil-
ian advisors were necessary "to insure inmates the means to frame and pres-
ent legal issues effectively for judicial consideration."' 173 The petitioner
contended on appeal that while the law libraries were adequate, a system of
civilian legal advisors had not been provided. As a result, the illiterate or
legally ignorant prisoners had to rely on "jailhouse lawyers," who may prac-
tice chicanery in one form or another.'
74
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, was unable to resolve the issue
because the requirement of civilian legal assistants was apparently aban-
doned, or at least modified, by a later order of the trial judge.' 75 Because
this order was unclear, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for additional
findings of fact.1
76
(parole commission can consider factors which would be unconstitutional if considered by a
court of law). But cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process protection applies to
parole revocation).
166. 603 F.2d at 807.
167. Id.
168. 614 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980). See also Battle v. Anderson, 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.
1979).
169. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
170. Id. at 828. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (access of prisoners to the
court system must not be obstructed).
171. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
172. Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 739 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
173. Id.
174. 614 F.2d at 255.
175. Id. at 256.
176. Id.
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Both Judges McKay and Doyle concurred, offering possible guidelines
for the district court. They indicated that consideration should be given to
the dangers inherent in affording jailhouse "writ writers" unreasonable con-
trol over their fellow inmates and suggested the use of volunteer assistants
from the legal community as an alternative.L77
In Harrell v. Keohane,' 78 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue
of whether a prisoner is denied access to the courts when denied access to
free photocopying. The Oklahoma Bureau of Prisons had promulgated
three procedural options for inmate copying. Harrell claimed that he could
not comply with any of the options: he could not afford to pay the ten cents
per copy that the prison charged; he could not have friends or family do the
copying because they were also poor; and he could not adequately reproduce
the needed complex documents with a typewriter and carbon paper.
179
The Tenth Circuit, following the mandate of Bounds v. Smith, 180 found
that "[r]easonable regulations are necessary to balance the legitimate inter-
ests of inmate litigants with budgetary considerations and to prevent
abuse."' 8' 1 The appellate court's ruling, denying free access to a photocopy-
ing machine, was in accordance with a previous holding which held that
prison inmates do not have an unrestricted right to free postage or use of a
typewriter. 182
The court of appeals also summarily dismissed appellant's contention
that the limited seating capacity of the prison law library denied court ac-
cess. Appellant did not claim deprivation of a legal right because of the lack
of space, nor did he assert that there were insufficient legal materials in the
crowded library.183 Since appellant was deemed not to be prejudiced in any
manner, the Tenth Circuit court dismissed his claim.
C. Availabtlity of Federal Habeas Corpus Relif
In Sanders v. Oli'ver,'184 the Tenth Circuit considered the question of what
constitutes an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of fourth amendment
claims in state court. When an unconstitutional search or seizure is claimed,
a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner only if he
has been denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claim in the
state forum.
185
177. Id. at 259.
178. 621 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 1060.
180. 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (one month wait for use of library deemed not to be a violation of
prisoner's right of access to the courts).
181. 621 F.2d at 1061.
182. Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 359 (10th Cir. 1978). But see Jones v. Diamond, 594
F.2d 997, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979) (when only prison procedure available to inmates is ordering
books from county law library, prisoners are denied free access to courts); Williams v. Leeke, 584
F.2d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1978) (forty-five minute limitation on use of law library restricts
meaningful access).
183. 621 F.2d at 1061.
184. 611 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 90 (1980).
185. This standard was first articulated in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). The
holding in Stone essentially stated that federal courts will not entertain claims involving a denial
of fourth amendment rights "where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
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Defendant Sanders was convicted by the State of Kansas for possessing
marijuana with the intent to sell. 18 6 Before trial he sought to suppress the
marijuana, which was seized in his house pursuant to a search warrant. At
the preliminary hearing, Sanders proved that the warrant's supporting affi-
davit was riddled with false statements. Despite these findings, the magis-
trate court held that the affidavit was still sufficient to support the probable
cause needed for the warrant. A further evidentiary hearing on the matter
was denied by the trial court.'
87
After his conviction in state court, Sanders exhausted all of the possible
state procedural remedies, going so far as to seek a rehearing of his certiorari
petition by the United States Supreme Court.' 88 Sanders then filed the pres-
ent habeas corpus action in federal district court, asserting again that the
affidavit was inaccurate and insufficient to support the search warrant. The
federal district court held that Sanders had already received the opportunity
for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment claim and therefore de-
nied his petition for federal habeas corpus relief.'8 9 Sanders appealed the
decision to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that "the refusal by the trial court to
hear testimony concerning factual assertions in the affidavit denied him an
opportunity for full and fair litigation."'
190
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the court, first noted that both the state
district and supreme courts had held that the affidavit information was suffi-
cient to support the search warrant, even after the inaccuracies were re-
moved.' 9 ' The Tenth Circuit agreed, however, with the federal district
court that the governing issue was whether the petition for federal habeas
corpus relief was barred by Stone v. Powell.192 The Tenth Circuit split its
consideration of this issue by dividing the standard into two parts: first, the
"oppportunity," and second, "full and fair" litigation.
The definition for the requisite "opportunity" to litigate fourth amend-
ment claims was an issue left open by the Supreme Court decision of Stone v.
Powell. In this case, the Tenth Circuit interpreted "opportunity" as mean-
litigation" of the claim. Id. at 494. For recent commentaries on the meaning of this standard,
see Note, Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: The "Opportuniy For Full And Fair Litigation" Stan-
dard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 (1978); Note, The 'Opportunz'y' Test of Stone v. Powell:
Towarda Predefimition of Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 VILL. L. REv. 1095 (1978); Note, Applying Stone
v. Powell: Full and Fair Litiation for Fourth Amendment Habeas Corpus Claims, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 319 (1978).
186. State v. Sanders, 222 Kan. 189, 563 P.2d 461 (1977).
187. 611 F.2d at 806.
188. The complete and orderly procedure Sanders followed was: 1) he filed a motion to
suppress the seized evidence at the preliminary hearing in the magistrate court; 2) he filed a pre-
trial motion to suppress; 3) he submitted a motion for new trial in the state district court; 4) he
took an appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court; 5) he filed a motion for rehearing by the Kansas
Supreme Court; 6) he submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court; 7) he petitioned for rehearing to the United States Supreme Court; 8) he filed a petition
for habeas corpus relief in federal district court; 9) he sought a rehearing by the federal district
court; and 10) he submitted a certificate of probable cause for appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Id.
at 806-07.
189. Id. at 807.
190. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original). See text accompanying note 187 supra.
191. Id. at 807.
192. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the "procedural opportunities to raise a claim, and it includes a full and
fair hearing." ' 93 This definition indicates that the Stone standard is basically
a procedural adequacy one, requiring the opportunity for an actual hearing,
in some form, on the claim.' 94 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the evidentiary
hearing in the state magistrate court provided this "opportunity."'
9 5
The court also decided that the evidentiary hearing constituted a "full
and fair" hearing under the requirement of Stone. 196 The opinion noted that
the defendant's examination of the affiant took up some sixty pages of the
evidentiary hearing transcript, and that the warrant was the principal issue
at trial. 197 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "one complete and un-
restricted evidentiary hearing with subsequent review by the state courts of
the issue and the facts so developed would seem sufficient under Stone.' ' 98
V. CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. False Statements and the "Exculpatoov No" Defense
In United States v. Fitzgibbon,'99 defendant Fitzgibbon was convicted of
violating the federal false statement statute.2° ° Fitzgibbon had traveled
from Canada to Denver by airplane and, upon arrival, he was greeted by
customs officials with various forms which needed to be filled out. One form
question inquires as to whether the traveler is entering the United States
with more than $5,000. Fitzgibbon checked the "no" box and also gave a
negative response when questioned by a customs official about importing
money. When the official observed him to be hesitant and nervous, Fitzgib-
bon was searched, and over $10,000 was found in his boots. After being
convicted for willfully making a false statement to a government agency, the
defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel because an "exculpatory no" defense was not raised
at trial.
20 '
The "exculpatory no" defense provides that a negative response, of it-
193. 611 F.2d at 808.
194. See Johnson v. Meachem, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant's waiver of hearing
opportunity barred habeas corpus review).
195. 611 F.2d at 808.
196. Id. See Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978) (evidentiary hearing and
at least a colorable application of correct fourth amendment constitutional standards required);
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (consideration of disputed facts by fact-
finding court and th4 availability of appeal required).
197. 611 F.2d at 808.
198. Id. Judge McKay concurred in the result. He felt that the court should have simply
affirmed the state court finding that the remaining truthful allegations in the affidavit sup-
ported probable cause. Under this analysis, the Stone question would need not have been ad-
dressed. Ild.
199. 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). The section provides:
Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
201. 619 F.2d at 875.
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self, cannot serve as proof of the intent needed to convict under the federal
false statement statute.20 2 The federal statute was designed to prevent the
perpetration of intentional frauds which hinder government agencies in ful-
filling their administrative duties. 20 3 In cases similar to Fitzgibbon's, courts
have upheld the "exculpatory no" defense on the ground that defendant's
negative response may only indicate an intention to enter the country with
more than $5000, which is not a crime., 2 4 Without specifically informing
defendants of the statutory requirements, it is almost impossible to prove
that false statements are intended to frustrate government functioning. For
example, an immigrant may make untruthful customs statements only be-
cause of the mistaken belief that currency over $5000 would be confis-
cated.
205
In this case, the Tenth Circuit found thai Fitzgibbon completely under-
stood that completion of the form was required prior to entry into the
United States, and that "the false statements he made were designed to con-
ceal information relevant to the administrative process." 20 6 The court noted
that prominent posters advised incoming travelers of the obligation to report
currency over $5000, and that the custom's form clearly stated that false
statements were punishable by law. 20 7 In addition, the Tenth Circuit held
that the reporting requirement did not violate Fitzgibbon's fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 20 8 If defendant had reported correctly the
currency amount, he would not have committed any crime. His habeas
corpus petition was therefore denied.
B. Weapons Used in Bank Robbeg
In Unted States v. Lucas,20 9 the defendant, Lucas, was convicted of bank
robbery. On appeal, Lucas asserted that there was insufficient evidence to
support the finding that the robbery was committed by "force and violence,
or by intimidation." 2 10 Upon entering the bank, Lucas brandished a toy
gun and demanded money. Every teller followed standard bank instructions
not to take any action or to respond in any way to a bank robber's directions.
While all of the tellers eventually noticed that the pistol was a toy, a few
202. Id. at 876. See Note, Fatrness In Cnmnal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement
Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 316 (1977).
203. 619 F.2d at 877-78. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
204. United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gra-
nada, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978).
205. See United States v. Granada, 565 F.2d at 926..
206. 619 F.2d at 880.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 881.
209. 619 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1980).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976). The section reads in part:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association. ...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.
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testified that they were frightened, shaken, or quite concerned about the ob-
viously stressful situation. 2 1' The Tenth Circuit court found that this testi-
mony constituted "objectively intimidating facts," facts which were
sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the "intimidation" element
was satisfied.
2 12
In United States v. Shannahan,2 13 the defendant was charged under the
same bank robbery statute applied in Lucas.2 14 Defendant, Shannahan, had
given a bank drive-up teller a bag which contained what appeared to be
dynamite, together with a note demanding money. Believing that the de-
fendant did have dynamite, the teller gave him several hundred dollars.
Shannahan later was convicted of bank robbery by force. The issue on ap-
peal was whether the elements of "a dangerous weapon or device" which
"puts in jeopardy the life of any person" during a bank robbery were satis-
fied by the use of the two fake sticks of dynamite.
2 15
Shannahan asserted that since the dynamite was not real, it was not
capable of putting the life of a person in jeopardy, and the prosecution,
therefore, failed in establishing its burden of proof. The Tenth Circuit, per
Judge Pickett, noted that some jurisdictions have held that the prosecution
must show that the weapon had an actual capability to cause death or physi-
cal harm.2 16 Other jurisdictions, including 'the Tenth Circuit, have held
that it is sufficient if the weapon or device appeared dangerous, putting the
robbery victim in reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily in-
jury.2 1 7 In Shannahan, the court reaffirmed this latter construction, stating
that the test was one of a subjective state of danger, that is, what the reason-
able victim believes the danger to be, rather than what is the actual capabil-
ity of the weapon used.
218
C. Interstate Transportation of a Forged Security
In United States v. Sparrow,2 19 defendant Sparrow was convicted on two
counts of interstate transportation of a falsely made or forged security.
220
The security involved in the first count was an original Oregon certificate of
211. 619 F.2d at 870-71.
212. Id. at 871.
213. 605 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1979).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976). For the text of the statute, see note 210 supra.
215. 605 F.2d at 540. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d):
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in sub-
sections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of
any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. United States,
447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971), vacatedon other grounds, 404 U.S. 567 (1972).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Waters, 461 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
218. 605 F.2d at 542.
219. 614 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) states, in pertinent part:
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign
commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited ....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
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title for an automobile which defendant had transported from Utah to
Idaho. The security in the second count was a duplicate certificate which
was sent from Oregon to Utah.
The facts were somewhat complicated. Sparrow bought a used Cadillac
in Utah with a bank loan. The bank recorded its lien on the back of the
orignal certficate nf title, which had been issued in Oregon. Sparrow then
went to Idaho, where he obtained a clear title to the car by submitting a
different version of the Oregon certificate, on which Sparrow was listed as
both owner and lienholder. Sparrow returned to Utah and exchanged the
Cadillac for a compact car and cash. He reported the Cadillac as stolen and
filed a claim with his insurance company. Sparrow proceeded to apply for a
duplicate Oregon certificate of title and transfer, which was issued in his
name and sent to the Utah bank as lienholder.
22 1
The defendant challenged the first count of his conviction, contending
that the government did not present evidence demonstrating the interstate
transportation element of the crime. Although there was a strong indication
that defendant had presented an altered certificate of title in Idaho, there
was no showing that the alteration had taken place in Utah. In fact, defend-
ant argued that there was a legal presumption that a forged instrument was
forged in the location where it was first found in its changed state.
222
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, rejected defendant's argument.
Instead, the court of appeals found that the essence of the statutory offense
was the fraudulent scheme, and that the interstate transportation element
was included "solely to afford federal jurisdiction. 2 2 3 The appellate court
noted that Sparrow's continued possession of the altered title was not ques-
tioned and that the document was the focus of his interstate scheme to de-
fraud.2 24 The interstate transportation element was satisfied because the
fraudulent scheme "had both its origin and consummation" in another state
and the "interstate movement of the certificates of title was, at all times, the
central means of accomplishing the criminal design."
'2 25
The second count charged that Sparrow had caused a duplicate title
certificate to be sent from Oregon to the bank in Utah, "knowing the same
to have been falsely made, forged and altered. '226 Sparrow contended that
at all times, including its travel between states, the duplicate title was genu-
ine, and not a forgery. The Tenth Circuit noted that the words "forged"
and "falsely made" had been interpreted to include "spurious or fictitious"
The defendant was also convicted of submitting a filse bank statement. 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(1976). This count was not appealed.
221. 614 F.2d at 230.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972).
223. 614 F.2d at 232. See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), ceri. dented,
401 U.S. 924 (1971).
224. 614 F.2d at 232-33.
225. 614 F.2d at 233. But see td. at 235-36 (McKay, J., dissenting) (criminal statutes must be
strictly construed and interstate transportation must be proved as an essential element of the
crime).
226. Id. at 230.
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execution of documents genuine on their face. 227 The court found that
Sparrow knew that the duplicate title, purporting to show that he was the
owner of the Cadillac, "could not be genuine inasmuch as he no longer owned
the vehicle and had not owned it for several months." 228 The court of ap-
peals affirmed Sparrow's conviction.
229
D. Theft From Interstate Commerce
In United States v. Luman,2 3 0 the defendant, Luman, was charged with
and convicted of stealing goods which were in interstate commerce. 23' The
goods consisted of a truckload of automobile tires, shipped from Wisconsin
to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The consignee did not sign the delivery receipt because
there was not enough time to unload all of the tires and verify the contents.
The consignee's employees, however, broke the seal of the trailer, removed
the packing slip, and padlocked the trailer, retaining the key. The trailer
was taken by the defendant during the night.
232
The main issue confronting the Tenth Circuit was whether the tires
were still in interstate commerce at the time of the theft. The Tenth Circuit
said that "no single event can be isolated as the point at which chattels lose
their character as an interstate shipment and become an intrastate shipment
or inventory." 233 The court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions,
2 34
noting that a consignee's acceptance and exercise of custody over goods ren-
ders them intrastate in character.235 In this case, however, both factors
were not present: while the consignee had taken custody of the tires, he had
not accepted delivery.
In reviewing the facts, the Tenth Circuit noted that the testimony of
both the carrier and the consignee demonstrated that neither regarded the
delivery as completed nor the goods as under the control or care of the con-
signee.236 The appellate court also observed that, at the time of the theft,
the tires remained on the trailer, separated from the consignee's inventory.
Furthermore, the court noted that the employees had not signed the delivery
receipt. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this was a sufficient factual basis
227. Id. at 234 (quoting United States v. Crim, 527 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dented,
425 U.S. 905 (1976); and United States v. Williams, 498 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1974)).
228. Id. (emphasis in original).
229. Id.
230. 622 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1980).
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) which states, in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud or deception obtains from any. . . motor truck, or other vehicle. . . with intent
to convert to his own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a part of or
which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, express or other prop-
erty . ...
Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
232. 622 F.2d at 491.
233. Id. at 492.
234. E.g., United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1970); Chapman v. United
States, 151 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1945); O'Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1941).
235. 622 F.2d at 493.
236. Id. at 493-94.
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for the jury to find that the goods were in interstate commerce at the time of
the theft.
23 7
Judge Holloway dissented, remarking that the federal government
should have allowed this crime to be prosecuted in state court. Judge Hollo-
way concluded, from the pertinent facts, that "effective possession and con-
trol of the tires" was in the consignee. 238 The judge rejected any notion that
uncompleted paperwork could be considered a salient factor in the distinc-
tion between interstate and intrastate commerce. He asserted, instead, that
the sole factor to be considered was who had actual dominion and control
over the property.
239
E. Lesser Included Offnses
In United States v. Pino,240 the defendant Pino, an Indian, was convicted
of involuntary vehicular manslaughter while on an Indian reservation. The
evidence showed that Pino was driving home after drinking with a few
friends. He collided with a disabled car, killing the driver who had been
making repairs under the hood.24 1 Pino argued on appeal that he was
wrongfully denied a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of careless
driving.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Holloway, first noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Keeble v. United States242 declared that a defendant is enti-
tled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence is such as to
permit a jury to rationally find him guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit
him of the greater offense. 243 The prosecution contended that in the Tenth
Circuit, the applicable standard provides that an instruction is proper only
when a lesser included offense is such that " 'it is impossible to commit the
greater without having first committed the lesser.' "244 Since involuntary
manslaughter may be committed independently of the careless driving of an
automobile, the government argued that the instruction request was prop-
erly denied by the trial court.
The Tenth Circuit court impliedly rejected its former test. The court of
appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruc-
tion when evidence which is necessary and offered to prove the greater of-
fense establishes the lesser offense.2 45 This standard was viewed as a
practical one; its application is to be determined by the offense charged and
by the evidence developed at trial.246 The court concluded that the prosecu-
tion's case in PAno had established all of the elements of a careless driving
237. Id. at 493.
238. Id. at 494 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 494-95.
240. 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1979).
241. 606 F.2d at 910-14.
242. 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (an Indian prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act of 1885 is
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
243. 412 U.S. at 212-14.
244. 606 F.2d at 915 (relying on Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961)).
245. 606 F.2d at 916 (citing with approval United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
246. Id.
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charge, and therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the
lesser included offense of careless driving.
2 4 7
In United States v. Chapman,248 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a defendant
is only entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense when the evi-
dence reasonably supports such a theory. The defendant, Chapman, was
convicted of premeditated murder.2 49 Witnesses testified that Chapman had
driven his truck to a house where the victim was located, that Chapman had
called the victim over to the truck, and that after a short discussion, Chap-
man shot the victim with a sawed-off shotgun. 250 Chapman claimed that
the shooting was an accident and his attorney tendered an instruction for the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused
the request because it felt that the evidence did not justify a lesser included
offense instruction.
251
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the trial court did not commit error.
The court of appeals stated that the decision whether to give an instruction
on a lesser included offense is within the sound discretion of a trial court.
252
The court cited Keeble v. United Stales253 for the proposition that an instruc-
tion need not be given when the evidence does not rationally support de-
fendant's theory. 254 Chapman's own testimony indicated that the shooting
was an accident, that he was happy at the time of the shooting, and that he
had only wanted to scare the victim. The majority of the court felt that this
testimony dispelled the notion that the shooting was done in the heat of
passion, an element required in the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
255
Judge Holloway dissented. Chapman had also testified about previous
disputes with the victim and about being drunk and being taunted immedi-
ately prior to the shooting. Judge Holloway felt that this was evidence to
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 256 He argued that a trial
court has no discretion to refuse an instruction if there is some evidence to
support a lesser included offense, even when the evidence is weak or contra-
dicted by other testimony.
257
247. Id. at 916-17.
248. 615 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1980).
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976) (murder); id. § 1153 (offenses committed within Indian
country).
250. 615 F.2d at 1295-96.
251. Id. at 1298.
252. Id.
253. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
254. 615 F.2d at 1299. See United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974)
(listing the dispositive factors of a lesser included offense).
255. 615 F.2d at 1300. The court commented that if the defendant had not testified, he
might have persuaded the trial court to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id.
256. Id. at 1302-03 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1301 (citing United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514, 523 (10th Cir.), cert. dened,
423 U.S. 845 (1972)).
The main distinction between the majority and the dissenting opinions seems to be the
individual judge's opinions as to the quantum of factual proof necessary to support a lesser
included offense instruction. Simply stated, the majority felt that the trial judge may deny, as a
matter of law, a lesser included offense instruction when there is not enough evidence for the
jury to rationally conclude that the lesser offense was committed. Alternatively, the dissenting
judge believed that if there is some evidence to support the defendant's claim, the jury, not the
trial judge, should decide whether a lesser included offense is merited by the facts.
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VI. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Discovery
In UnitedStates v. Bump, 258 the defendant, Bump, requested discoverable
information under rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
* .se,,o the govcrr ncr's ,ci..Lpuat rcquest unuerulc 16(U),29 DUIp S
attorney disclosed that he intended to introduce a charge card receipt for an
airplane ticket and hotel registration records showing that the defendant was
out of town during the time of the alleged conspiracy. 26° These documents
were never produced. At trial, Bump testified as to his alibi but did not
mention any supporting evidence. During cross-examination, the prosecutor
used the attorney's earlier representation of documentary evidence, and its
apparent nonexistence, for impeachment purposes. Bump contended, on ap-
peal, that this line of questioning was an impermissible intrusion into confi-
dential statements made between attorney and client, that it deprived him of
the effective assistance of counsel, and that it made him a witness against
himself in violation of the fifth amendment.
26 '
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, quickly dismissed the attorney-
client privilege contention. The court observed that even when a privilege
exists with regard to a statement made between a client and his attorney, the
privilege is waived once the statement is revealed to a third party. 262 Since
Bump failed to demonstrate that the disclosures made by his attorney were
without his consent, he did not uphold his burden of proving that the com-
munication was privileged.
2 63
The Tenth Circuit examined Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)
for a disposition of defendant's other claims. The court of appeals had diffi-
258. 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979). Also within this survey period the Tenth Circuit de-
cided United States v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980) (Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(b) does not require a trial court to grant a defendant's motion for the subpoena of
a witness where the witness would only provide cumulative testimony).
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b) provides, in part:
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
(A) Documents and Tangible Objects. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(l)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the govern-
ment to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tan-
gible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or
control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in
chief at the trial.
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure.
Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the dis-
covery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents
made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation
or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or
defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant,
his agents or attorneys.
260. 605 F.2d at 550.
261. Id.
262. See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 351 U.S. 943
(1956) (client's statement made to attorney, with intent that it be communicated to others, is
not privileged).
263. 605 F.2d at 551. See, e.g., United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973)
(defendant failed to carry burden of proving that evidence was privileged).
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culty in determining whether the representations of Bump's attorney were
nondiscoverable statements under rule 16(b)(2) or whether they were discov-
erable documents under rule 16(b)(1)(A). 264 The appellate court skirted this
issue by assuming that the discovery rule required Bump's attorney to dis-
close his client's statements concerning what the documents purported to
prove. 265 Relying on analogous Supreme Court precedents,266 the court of
appeals held that the forced disclosure did not violate Bump's rights to be
protected against self-incrimination and to effective assistance of counsel.
26 7
The Tenth Circuit also found that the government's use of the represen-
tations of defendant's attorney was not prejudicially unfair. 268 The repre-
sentations were used only for impeachment when defendant took the stand.
The court of appeals compared this situation, involving discovered evidence,
to that where statements obtained in violation of constitutional rights are
used for impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court, in Harris v. New
York, 269 held that evidence suppressed because of a fifth amendment viola-
tion may be used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony. Simi-
larly, the Tenth Circuit has held that discovered evidence could be used for
impeachment purposes even if the defendant has not specifically utilized it
in his defense.
270
As mentioned earlier, 27 1 the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether rule
16(b) requires disclosure of a defendant's statements concerning document
relevancy as well as the documents themselves. Under rule 16(b), a defend-
ant, after requesting discovery under rule 16(a), must permit inspection of
documents which he intends to introduce at trial. 272 In this case, however,
the defendant apparently had no exculpatory document within his "posses-
sion, custody or control" at the time of the rule 16(b) request. 27 3 If and
when these exculpatory documents were found, the defendant would have
been required to disclose them immediately.2 74 Until the time when the
actual documents are in the attorney's hands, any attorney-client communi-
cations as to their existence and potential use at trial should be nondiscover-
able.2 75 In view of the Bump decision, defense attorneys would be wise not to
264. See note 259 supra for text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
265. 605 F.2d at 551.
266. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 235 (1975) (forced pre-trial disclosure applies
only to evidence that defendant intends to introduce at trial and applies only when defendant
makes discovery request); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state rule, which required
defendant to disclose intention to rely upon alibi defense, declared to be constitutional).
267. 605 F.2d at 552.
268. Id.
269. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
270. 605 F.2d at 552. &e also United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980) (evidence
suppressed as fruit of unlawful search and seizure may be used to impeach false testimony of-
fered on cross-examination); United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979) (evi-
dence suppressed, because obtained in violation of right to counsel, may be used to impeach
false testimony).
271. See text accompanying notes 264-65 supra.
272. See note 259 supra for the text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
273. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A). See note 259 supra.
274. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
275. See id. 16(b)(2). See note 259 supra.
Clearly, the purported evidence showing that Bump was in St. Louis at the time of the
conspiracy constituted an alibi. Although this evidence was revealed pursuant to rule 16(b),
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voluntarily disclose the existence of exculpatory documents unless certain
that they will be used at trial. If the documents are not found, or, when
found, are not used as evidence, the representations of their existence may
prejudice the client by providing the prosecution with impeachment ammu-
nition.
B. Judge Recusal
In United States v. Gzgax, 276 one of the issues before the Tenth Circuit
court was whether the district court judge should have recused himself be-
cause of personal prejudice against the defendant. The defendant, Gigax,
was convicted of willfully making false statements on the Internal Revenue
Service's W-4 form, where he claimed twenty-one allowances and exemp-
tions. The defendant alleged that the judge had made statements, at the
post-conviction hearings, which displayed personal prejudice against the de-
fendant and against tax protesters in general.
277
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, began its analysis by comparing
the two federal statutes pertaining to judge recusal. 278 Section 144 essen-
tially states that, ten days before trial, an affidavit may be filed relating facts
which demonstrate a personal prejudice, by the judge, for or against one of
the parties in the case.279 When a trial judge is presented with an affidavit
under section 144, he must accept as true the facts alleging personal
prejudice. 280 It is the challenged judge who then determines whether the
factual allegations are legally sufficient to justify recusal. 28 1 Section 455, on
the other hand, states that a judge, on his own initiative, must recuse himself
when a reasonable man may question his impartiality.28 2 The Tenth Circuit
rather than as an alibi under rule 12.1, an argument could be made that a reasonable interpre-
tation would apply provision () of rule 12.1 in either case. Rule 12.1(f0 states that "evidence of
an intention to rely upon alibi defense, later withdrawn; or of statements made in connection
with such intention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings against a person who
gave notice of the intention." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(l). The Tenth Circuit, however, found
similar statements admissible in this case on the grounds that although rule 16 was amended at
the same time as rule 12.1, the "inadmissible" language was not included in the former. 605
F.2d at 552. Bump's statements, however, could not have been protected under rule 12.1()
since he retained his alibi defense when testifying.
276. 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
277. Id. at 513.
278. Id. at 510-12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
279. Apparently, this remedy was not used by the defendant, for the alleged personal
prejudice did not become apparent until the post-conviction hearings.
The Tenth Circuit has enforced strict compliance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 809 (1942); Freed v. Inland
Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458 (D. Utah 1959).
280. See Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702
(1942).
281. United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976). See
Note, Disqua/ifwation of a Federal Thstrt Judgefor Bias-The Standard under Section 144, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 749 (1973).
282. See Note, Duquaification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 US C § 455, 71
MICH. L. REV. 538 (1973).
The judge must determine whether a reasonable person would believe that a personal, as
opposed to a judicial bias, existed. Judicial bias is simply an opinion on the law or facts devel-
oped during trial and is not sufficient to require disqualification of a judge. In contrast, per-
sonal bias stems from an extrajudicial source, such as a racial prejudice, and results in a decision
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concluded that, under both statutes, the appropriate standard to be used is
"whether a reasonable person would have questioned the district judge's im-
partiality," for the appearance of impartiality is virtually as important as the
fact of impartiality.
283
The alleged prejudicial conduct arose after the trial, at sentencing and
bond hearings. The Tenth Circuit observed that a trial court judge has wide
and almost unrestricted discretion during post-conviction hearings. 284 The
judge may consider all of the pertinent circumstances relating to the defend-
ant's background and the nature of the crime. 285 The Tenth Circuit be-
lieved that the trial judge in GCiax was only exercising this broad discretion,
albeit in an aggressive manner. The court of appeals concluded that " '[a]
judge cannot be disqualified because he believes in upholding the law, even
though he says so with vehemence.' "286
C. Trial Court Discretion
In United States v. Taylor,28 7 the Tenth Circuit was asked to review a
discretionary order of the trial court. The district court had refused to grant
a mistrial after a police officer testified, in front of the jury, that he had
previously "worked a case on" defendant Taylor. The judge found it suffi-
cient to exclude the evidence and to instruct the jury to disregard the testi-
based on irrelevancies. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States
v. Hall, 424 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Okla. 1975), affd, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Davis
v. Cities Service Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1970).
283. 605 F.2d at 512. See Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Hall, 424 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Okla. 1975). If the allegations of bias and
prejudice are merely the selfish and subjective opinions of a few, the judge has a duty not to
disqualify himself. See generally Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972); United States v. Bray,
546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
dented, 430 U.S. 909 (1977); Antonello v. Wunsch, 500 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1974). When a
judge's conduct might reasonably be questioned as motivated by bias or prejudice, it is
mandatory that the judge recuse himself even if he holds a good faith belief that he could
conduct an impartial proceeding. Blizard v. Fielding, 454 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1978), a ffdsub
noma., Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1979).
284. 605 F.2d at 512. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (no limitation on information concerning
"background, character, and conduct" for sentencing convicted defendant); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (no limitation on either the source or kind of information
which can be considered by a sentencing judge). But see United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d
527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973) ("[u]nder § 144 a defendant is entitled to trial before a judge who is not
biased against him at any point of the trial and, indeed, most importantly, at sentencing."). See
also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-52 (1949) (discussion of different evidentiary rules
governing trial and sentencing procedures).
Judicial prejudice exhibited during trial is treated differently. In Hayes v. National Football
League, the court stated that "when a trial judge makes hostile remarks in the presence of ajury
the courts use entirely different criteria to determine their prejudicial effect, reversal being pre-
mised upon the prejudicial effect upon the jury, rather than the personal bias or prejudice
possessed by the judge." 463 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
285. 605 F.2d at 513-14. See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1262 (2d Cir. 1979)
(sentencing judge's consideration of defendant's general character and prior record is permissi-
ble); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 (5th Cir. 1979) (consideration of defendant's
background is within the judge's discretion).
286. 605 F.2d at 514 (quoting Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
892 (1956)). See also Montgomery v. United States, 344 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1965) (sentencing
judge may use forceful and emphatic language).
287. 605 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1979).
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mony. 288 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, noted that great deference is
accorded to such a determination since the trial judge is in the best position
to measure the impact of improper evidence on the jury. 289 The court of
appeals enumerated the major factors to be considered in determining the
necessity of a mistrial after impermissible remarks upon a defendant's crimi-
nal record:
Mistrial is most likely to becousie necessary when the evidence ts
admitted, indicates on its face that defendant has been guilty of a
prior crime, and the evidence plays a prominent part in the con-
duct of the trial. Conversely, prejudicial error is least likely to oc-
cur when the evidence is excluded, the jury is instructed to
disregard it, and the reference is both vague and passing in na-
ture.
290
The court concluded that, in light of the fact that there was no further refer-
ence to the prior case involving Taylor, the short and insignificant nature of
the remark, the cautionary instruction given to the jury, and the more than
adequate evidence to sustain the conviction, there was no error.291
D. Guilty Pleas
In Sena v. Romero,292 the defendant Sena petitioned for federal habeas
corpus relief on the basis that his guilty plea in state court was uninformed,
involuntary, and lacking a factual basis; all in violation of the Supreme
Court decision in BoyX-h v. Alabama.293 The Boykin Court held that due proc-
ess requires that a plea of guilty be voluntary and intelligent since the plea
involves the waiver of several constitutional rights. 294 While a fixed proce-
dure need not be followed, the trial judge does have the affirmative duty to
make an on the record examination of the accused to insure that he com-
pletely comprehends the consequences of his guilty plea.
2 95
In Sena, the federal district court had ordered that an evidentiary hear-
ing be held before a magistrate since the state court transcript was deficient,
if not totally silent, on the guilty plea issue.296 Although there was conflict-
288. Id. at 1178.
289. Id. at 1179. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978) (trial judge responsi-
ble for conducting fair trial); United States v. Evans, 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1101 (1977) (mistrial order is within sound discretion of trial court).
290. 605 F.2d at 1179.
291. Id. See United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1977).
292. 617 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1980).
Also within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant's motion, made
before sentencing, to withdraw his plea of guilty must be examined carefully and liberally. The
court of appeals reversed a trial court's denial of the motion since there was no hearing on the
plea withdrawal, and no reasons for denying the request were stated. United States v. Hancock,
607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979). Set FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(d). See also Dorton v. United States, 447
F.2d 401, 411-12 (10th Cir. 1971).
293. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
294. Id. at 242.
295. Id. at 243 (a waiver of constitutional rights cannot be presumed from a silent record);
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See a/so McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969). But cf. United States v. Eaton, 579 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant need not be
informed of collateral consequences of a guilty plea).
296. 617 F.2d at 580.
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ing evidence as to the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry into Sena's desire
to plead guilty, the magistrate concluded that the defendant had failed to
meet his burden of proof and that the preponderance of the evidence demon-
strated that defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The fed-
eral district court adopted these findings and denied the habeas corpus
petition.
297
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, reversed on the issue of burden of
proof. The court of appeals held that, where there is a silent record, the
burden is on the government to make "an affirmative showing" that the
guilty plea and waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights were "know-
ingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
'298
E. Sentencing
In United States v. Klusman,299 the main issue presented was whether a
judge's recollection of a defendant's earlier conviction is an improper consid-
eration in sentencing. The trial judge remembered placing Klusman on pro-
bation for a previous drug offense. Before pronouncing sentence, the judge
told the defendant that he was unsure of "what it is going to take to convince
you that the drug business isn't a profitable business."
300
The defendant's first conviction was as a juvenile and was subsequently
set aside pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). 30i Klus-
man argued that any subsequent consideration of this "expunged" convic-
tion violated the statute. The government contended that the FYCA was
intended to facilitate rehabilitation of youthful offenders and not to interfere
with judicial discretion in subsequent sentencing matters.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, found it unnecessary to decide the
issue of expungement. The court of appeals expressed doubt as to whether
setting aside a conviction under the FYCA is the equivalent of expunge-
ment, 30 2 but Judge Doyle asserted that even if it is, there is no right to ex-
297. Id. at 581.
298. Id. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US. 238, 242 (1969); United States v. Pricepaul, 540
F.2d 417, 423-24 (9th Cir. 1976) (nothing more than a silent record is needed to shift the burden
of proof to the government). But cf. Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1973)
(record indicating a voluntary and intelligent plea need not show express waiver of each consti-
tutional right).
299. 607 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1979). Within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit also
decided United States v. Haney, 615 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1980) (judge may not commit defend-
ant convicted under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976), and also
impose a special parole term provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (l) (A) (1976)), and United States v.
Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1979) (failure to advise the defendant of special parole term is
only a technical violation when the total sentence imposed is less than the maximum sentence
which the court had told defendant he might receive).
300. 607 F.2d at 1333.
301. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976). See United States v. Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d II
(6th Cir. 1976).
302. 607 F.2d at 1334. Set United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977) (FYCA pro-
vides a "unique shield" from prejudicial effects of conviction, but does not provide for expunge-
ment); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976). See also cases cited in note 301
.npra.
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punge a judge's memory.30 3 The broad sentencing discretion vested in a
trial judge permits consideration of relevant facts within his personal knowl-
edge.30 4 The court of appeals concluded that the judge "could be mindful of
the prior conviction in the present circumstances.
' 30 5
Todd L. Vriesman
303. 607 F.2d at 1334.
304. Judge Doyle also noted that the less than maximum sentence imposed reflected no
prejudicial effect from the previous conviction. Id. at 1333. See generally United States v. Eaton,
579 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Green, 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert.
dented, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973).
305. 607 F.2d at 1334. Cf Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) (no limitations,
including consideration of defendant's lack of cooperation with the government, should be
placed on sentencing considerations). But cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49
(1972) (due process forbids trial court reliance on unconstitutional convictions in sentencing
decisions).
